Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial Nigeria by Dr R Mustapha
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS09 Page 1
Working Paper Number 9
Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial
Nigeria.
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Ethnic minority identities and their associated politics of disadvantage have been a
central feature of post-colonial Nigerian politics. Tensions which became manifest in the
1950s have combined with new developments such as the militarization and
personalization of state institutions and politics, demographic changes and the
economics of structural adjustment to create a volatile situation which has affected the
transformation of ethnic minority identities and the trajectory of minority politics.
Three case studies are considered which show transformations in minority identities and
how these transformations are themselves part of a wider realignment of politics in ways
which have profound consequences for the national and international politics of the
Nigerian state. In this way, the salience of identity issues in the current African crises is
highlighted.
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A. Introduction.
This paper attempts to explore the transformations that have taken place in minority
identities in Nigeria since the post-colonial period. A comprehensive effort in this regard
would involve the study of many hundred ethnic minorities. What is attempted in this
paper is far less ambitious. A general socio-political overview will be followed by
illustrations from three of the most problematic areas in the management of minority
politics in Nigeria: Zangon Kataf in southern Kaduna State, Ogoni in the Niger Delta,
and the Wukari/Takum area of Taraba State. The Kataf and Ogoni cases have received
extensive attention elsewhere (cf. Saro-Wiwa 1995; Naanen 1995; Human Rights
Watch/Africa 1995; Mustapha 1996). The issues involved in both cases will therefore be
presented only in summary form, more attention being paid to the relatively obscure
circumstances in Taraba State. Finally, against the background of developments within
minority identities in Nigeria, the paper will explore the place of identities in the socio-
political crises of the African state system.
B. Ethnic Minority Identities: An Overview.
Identities are constantly changing, particularly in periods of great socio-economic flux.
Like most other people who came into contact with colonialism, those now referred to as
minority ethnic groups in Nigeria crystallized an ethnic consciousness in the early
colonial period. It was much later, in the 1950s, that a ‘minority’ identity emerged,
overlapping with their extant ethnic identity. The very notion of ethnic minorities gained
currency in Nigerian political discourse from the immediate pre-independence
constitutional negotiations of the early 1950s. These negotiations created three regional
governments and also expanded the scope for electoral politics and the gradual transfer of
powers. There were a number of assumptions that underlay these developments: that the
dominant parties represented ethnic interests; that these ethnic interests would be
dominant in their respective regions; and that those outside these ethnic blocs, but subject
nonetheless to the regional governments, would be at a serious political and economic
disadvantage. The smaller ethnic groups in each of the regions tended to see themselves
as confronting a situation akin to a majoritarian dictatorship in which majority interests
held sway, and the minorities had no say (Willink Commission 1958). Ethnic minority
identity developed, not necessarily as a question of numbers or cultural differences, but
as a recognition of their ‘powerlessness’ in the face of ethnicized electoral politics.
The central deficit in this characterization was power. As Ekeh (1994) points out,
numerical strength and political power did not necessarily coincide in pre-colonial
Nigeria. He draws attention to the political domination of the Sokoto Caliphate by the
Fulani minority, the exploitation of the more numerous Ibibios of the interior by the Efik
of Old Calabar, a similar exploitation of the Igbo of the hinterland by the eastern Ijaw
(Izon), and the exploitation of the Urhobo by the Itsekiri. In each of these cases, Ekeh
points out that special circumstances arose which placed the minority group in a position
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colonial and post-colonial relations. However, Ekeh’s analysis makes no distinction
between the Fulani aristocratic clans in power, and the vast majority of the nomadic and
sedentary Fulani, who have no stake in power, and are themselves part of the governed.
Secondly, he tends to conflate political domination, as in the sahelian Caliphate, with
economic exploitation, as in Old Calabar. These qualifications notwithstanding, his
central argument about power and numbers in pre-colonial Nigeria is quite valid.
In the constitutional/political dispensation that unfolded from 1951, numbers
corresponded directly to political power. The minority ethnic groups that were so defined
in post-1951 Nigeria are therefore largely political minorities, because in the unfolding
electoral and regional politics, small numbers in one’s constituency translated into
powerlessness. In most, but not all cases, issues of culture, history or socio-political
development played no part in the characterization.
The response of the minorities to their situation in the period 1951-1983 was basically
three-pronged, each impacting on the elaboration of minority identities. In the first place,
some minority groups ganged up to demand a regional government of their own. One
such grouping was the COR (Calabar, Ogoja & Rivers) movement, which sought to
extricate the minority groups in those provinces from the perceived clutches of the Igbo-
dominated Eastern Regional government. Recognition of a common circumstance had
forced a unity of purpose among some of the groups. Particularist identities now
overlapped with the newly constructed  identity of being minorities in a similar boat. An
identity that was constructed and imposed by circumstances beyond their control was
now appropriated in their response to the emerging political situation.
Secondly, failing to get new regions of their own, the ethnic minorities sought to limit
the powers of regional governments over their affairs. They sought to do this by arguing
for a stronger central government which would ameliorate regional excesses. In
particular, the minorities agitated for a centralized police force (Willink Commission
1958). To a large extent, minority groups have tended to develop a more abiding faith in
the Nigerian nation-state, relative to their compatriots from the majority groups of Igbo,
Hausa and Yoruba. In the centrifugal crises of 1966-7, minority groups virtually stood
alone in consistently defending the integrity of the Nigerian nation-state. And the
concentration of power at the centre after 1970 had the active support of many
bureaucrats from minority backgrounds.
The third response of the minorities was to form political alliances with dominant
political parties in other regions, in order to secure a modicum of protection from their
‘own’ regional governments and governing parties. Minority parties such as the Bornu
Youth Movement, the Benin Delta Peoples Party, the Niger Delta Congress and Middle
Belt Peoples Party emerged in this context (Okpu 1977). This strategy was to implicate
the minorities in the struggle over power-sharing and ascendancy at the centre between
the three dominant groups and their political parties. In many instances, minority politics,
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majority parties to which particular minorities were allied. Amongst the political class in
the minority areas, there emerged the odd admixture of both oppositional and clientalistic
strands.
Of course, the above tendencies were not the only ones at work in the development of
minority identities in this period. The creation of states from 1967, ostensibly to meet
minority demands, altered minority attitudes in two ways. Firstly, some minority groups
now found themselves in control of new states, often with some other minorities
subjected to the control of such state governments. This led to the emergence of statism
or state consciousness in some cases, and in others, to the development of political
squabbles between what are now ‘majority minorities’ on the one hand, and ‘minority
minorities’ on the other. Some of the solidarity built up under such organisations as the
COR State Movement and the Middle Belt Congress started to collapse.
The second way in which the creation of states affected minority consciousness was that
it became apparent that state creation, very much like the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing fundamental human rights in the 1951-1966 period, could not safeguard
minority interests. Minority agitators for state creation had assumed that states would be
created for minorities alone, given the fact that the majorities already had political
control of some governments. In the event, states were created for both majorities and
minorities, with majority interests still dominant in most states. And these states were
created in an era of increased political and economic concentration of powers at the
centre. The minorities realized that they had acquired access to and even control of state
governments precisely when power had shifted elsewhere. The problems surrounding
state creation not only split minority solidarity in many cases, it also introduced a
heightened consciousness of the federal centre, intensified struggle for access to that
centre, and an increasingly acrimonious relationship between that centre and some
minority groups, particularly those from the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta.
Fiscal centralization meant federal control of revenue from oil, a resource found largely
in southern minority areas. In pre centralization years, regions had fiscal control over
their agrarian and mineral resources. The multiplication of demands for state creation
arose partly because political entrepreneurs from both majority and minority groups saw
the creation of a state under their control as the surest way to plug directly into the
centralized national purse. Contractors, civil servants and local politicians collude to
dredge up real or perceived differences in order to justify particular claims to new states
and central patronage. Minority groups in the north continue to play along with this
distributive logic. On the other hand, the southern minorities have become increasingly
resentful, claiming that their God-given resources have been commandeered by others.  
Another development which affected minority identities was the process of class
formation. The political elite which spearheaded agitation in minority areas from the
1930s and against minority status from the 1950s was made up largely of priests, teachers
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determinant factors in elite status. By the 1980s, the elite in many minority areas had
greatly expanded and now included young professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and a
sprinkling of businessmen. Increasingly, elite status is determined not just by education,
but also by wealth and life-style. These younger elements of the minority elite did not
have the political connections of the older elite and were more prone to suffer the impact
of competition for jobs, contracts and other resources at the national level. They were
therefore less likely to be clientalist in their orientation; indeed, many became
increasingly confrontational in their quest for a ‘fairer’ share of political and economic
resources. Even by the mid-1960s, restive young men from the minority ethnic groups
were beginning to side-step their political associations and embark on ‘direct action’ to
agitate for their interests (Okpu 77,136).
On the whole, economic and political change, including economic crisis and the military
centralization of power, have tended to alter the parameters of political and economic
advantages. In turn, these changes have redefined perceptions of minority interests and
identity, leading to the frantic reformulation of that identity and the repositioning of
various groups in the political terrain to take advantage of particular shifts, or to shield
themselves from potentially negative consequences. I argue that the result is hardly the
realization of legitimate minority claims, but the fragmentation and destabilization of the
entire political process.
C. Illustrations of Changing Identities: Zangon Kataf, Ogoni and Taraba.
Some of the general points made in the preceding section can be further elaborated in the
illustrative cases discussed here. The central objective is not just to pin-point changes in
minority identities, but to seek to explain such transformations. These explanations are
against the background of the enormous transformations of the Nigerian state and
economy since 1970. While these latter changes are not directly addressed, relevant
developments are occasionally referred to.
C.1 Zangon-Kataf: The Historicity and Continuity in Minority Identity.
Zangon Kataf falls within a region in central Nigeria which has become prone to inter-
communal clashes over land and other agricultural resources. There were the Kasuwan
Magani riots in 1980/1, the Gure/Kahugu riots in Saminaka Local Government Area in
1984, the  Lere riots in 1986, and the Kafanchan riots in 1987. The dynamic of
communal blood-letting in this region has come to be epitomized in the national
consciousness by the very bloody confrontations in Zangon Kataf in February and May
1992. The central problem here is not just the ‘pure’ expression of the proverbial
majority/minority divide, but the manner in which notions of history, citizenship and
justice are fiercely contested by neighbouring communities to a point where there is little
common ground left for conciliation and compromise (Mustapha 1994).QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS09 Page 7
Zangon Kataf is a Hausa settlement (zango) within a territory occupied by the Kataf, a
minority ethnic group in  north-central Nigeria. The original town was established as a
trading post for Hausa merchants en route to the Niger Basin in the early part of the 16th
century. While the Hausa of Zangon Kataf and the Kataf tribal polity established
economic and commercial relations, they had little in the way of social relations, Zangon
Kataf being a wholly Hausa settlement. The Hausa settlement was also politically
autonomous. By the end of the 18th century, the settlement became subordinated to
Kauru, a larger Hausa settlement within the territory of another ethnic minority in the
same region, the Ruruma. Early in the 19th century, Kauru itself became subordinated to
Zaria, one of the major Hausa states that constituted the Sokoto Caliphate.
For much of the 19th century, the minority ethnic groups south of Zaria, the Kataf
included, were raided for slaves to supply the domestic needs of the Sokoto Caliphate,
and for export on both the trans-Saharan and the trans-Atlantic slave routes. From the
Kataf point of view, the Hausa community of Zangon Kataf were seen as distinct from
the Hausa slave raiders from Zaria. With the imposition of British colonial rule at the
turn of the 20th century, however, the Kataf polity was subordinated to the Emir of
Zaria, under Lugard’s policy of Indirect Rule. Kataf territory became Katuka District of
Zaria Emirate. In 1902, 1904, 1905 and 1907 the Kataf attacked Zangon Kataf, allegedly
for colluding with the British and the Hausa emirate of Zaria in their designs to subjugate
the Kataf. The colonial army was called in to suppress the attacks. Subsequently, Zangon
Kataf town was moved to its present location about 1915. For much of the 20th century,
especially between 1920 and 1950, there has been a steady influx of Hausa people to
Zangon Kataf, primarily from the Emirates of Zaria, Kano, Katsina and Bauchi.
The Zangon Kataf crises started over the construction of a new market by the Local
Government Authority. Disagreement between some members of both Kataf and Hausa
communities over the issue led to clashes early in February 1992, resulting in a number
of fatalities. From the 15th to the 17th of May 1992, fresh rioting erupted in Zangon
Kataf. The immediate unfolding of the May riot has become the subject of intense
controversy as each community tries to justify its conduct. There are divergent positions
as to who started the killings. There is no doubt, however, that most of the victims were
the Hausa of Zangon Kataf. There is evidence to suggest that at least 1536 Hausas were
killed in Zangon Kataf. Most of the houses in the town were razed to the ground and
Hausa household property valued at N29,173,850 destroyed. It has also been estimated
that about 71 motor vehicles and 25 motor cycles and bicycles were also destroyed.
These events precipitated rioting in other parts of Kaduna State; large-scale rioting broke
out in Kaduna, Zaria, Ikara, and Kauru. Kaduna is the state capital, while Zaria and Ikara
constitute the Hausa heartland of the State. In Kaduna and Zaria, hundreds of lives were
lost, either in the rioting, or in police/military actions that followed. Seven peopled were
reportedly shot dead by the police in Ikara (Mustapha 1994).
In the arguments which the Kataf put forward to justify their conduct during the crises,
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that the Kataf have historically welcomed strangers into their midst. These strangers were
given clan/communal lands to cultivate but there was no alienation of the land from the
original household, lineage or clan, as the case may be. Individual ownership was not
part of the tribal land tenure. Strangers were often absorbed into Kataf society, especially
the Netzit (Our People) who are the other minority ethnic groups of the region,
particularly from southern Kaduna state and parts of Plateau State. The Kataf argument
goes on to suggest that when the Hausa merchants came to the Kataf polity in the 16th
century, they were given land to build their settlement but the rights of ownership over
the land remained with the Kataf clans. A mark of this continued ownership, consistent
with their traditional tenure system, was their abiding right to harvest the tree crops on
the land which they had given to strangers to cultivate. Since most of the Hausa
immigrants were traders or craftsmen, they rarely had need of farmland.
Though both communities remained politically and culturally distinct, there was little
conflict between them, even when slave raiders from Zaria Emirate launched attacks on
the Kataf. The problem started, the Kataf claim, from the imposition of British colonial
rule in the early 20th century. While the Emir of Zaria, for regional geo-political reasons
succumbed to colonial imposition without a fight, the Kataf forcefully resisted colonial
domination. Against this background, the Kataf were regarded by the British as
‘ungovernable’. Given their lack of a centralized state structure and their traditional
religion, they were regarded as ‘uncivilized pagans’ who were incapable of self-
governance. Furthermore, racist colonial anthropology characterized the Kataf as inferior
to the lighter-skinned Fulani elite of the Emirates, who were not only monotheists but
had also built up a large empire, the Sokoto Caliphate. The Kataf claim that the British
were therefore favourably disposed to accept the Zaria claim that the Kataf polity had
been ‘conquered’ by Zaria in pre-colonial times. As far as they were concerned, Zaria,
through Kauru, may lay claim to the political allegiance of the Hausa community of
Zangon Kataf but that had nothing to do with the political autonomy of the Kataf or their
ownership of the land on which the town stood.
With the loss of their traditional political system based on clans and their subjugation to
an ‘alien’ authority, the Kataf claim that they became victims of a series of injustices.
They were excluded from the District administration, which became a wholly Hausa
affair, right down to the messengers. They were also subjected to various indignities by
the ‘alien’ local administration: cultural denigration by being derogatorily referred to as
arna (non-Moslems or pagans) and kabila (non-Hausa), tyrannical excesses by the
Emir’s Native Police (dogarai), and subjugation to the unsympathetic arbitrariness of the
Emir’s Alkali courts, which dispensed a form of law based on Islamic principles which
were alien to the Kataf. They also complained of excessive taxation, confiscation of their
goods for failure to pay, and exclusion from the markets built with Kataf forced labour.
They claimed that the ordeal of forced labour was not extended to the Hausas of Zangon
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Above all else, the Kataf complained that the colonial and local administrations
encouraged the influx of Hausa settlers to the area, leading to the forcible transfer of
Kataf farmlands to new Hausa immigrants. The emergence of large-scale farming in the
1970s intensified this process through the agency of various State administrations. At the
same time, the intensification of development projects in the country from the 1970s,
fuelled by oil-boom petro-dollars also increased contestation over land rights, as
individuals and groups sought to receive the compensation paid by the state for land
acquired.
The Kataf claim that they protested their situation through numerous petitions to the
colonial administration, often with the assistance of Christian missionaries who had
gained a foothold in the area. After a riot by the Kataf in 1933, and again in 1946, they
agitated for the formation of an Independent Tribal Council composed of ‘indigenous’ -
that is Kataf -  representatives. These demands were not met, even though they had the
support of some colonial administrators. After  another episode of rioting in 1953, the
principle of including some Kataf in the District Council was accepted but it was made
clear that the district still remained under the Emir. As a result, a few Kataf got into the
administration, especially at the Village Head level. The agitation for an Independent
Tribal Council continued. Kataf agitation for an ‘indigenous’ District Head subsequently
led, in 1967, to the transfer of the Sarkin Yakin Zazzau from the District and his
replacement by the first ‘indigenous’ (Kataf) District Head, Bala Dauke Gora. He was
also conferred with the traditional Zaria title of Kuyambannan Zazzau. Considering that
the emirate officials from Zaria defined ‘indigeneity’ in the districts of southern Kaduna
to include the Hausa and Fulani communities of the area and continued to appoint same
as ‘indigenous’ officials, the Kataf, along with other minority ethnic groups in the area,
reverted to their old demand for their own independent, ‘traditional’, chiefdoms in 1974.
The 1976 Local Government Reform created the possibility for the minority ethnic
groups of southern Kaduna State, who nevertheless constituted a huge majority over the
Hausa/Fulani communities in the area, to vote in their own people as chairmen of the
local government councils. However, in their view, this development did not address
their problem as the elected local government chairmen were incorporated into the Zaria
Emirate Council as subordinates of the Emir. Furthermore, all District and Village
Heads, though employees of, and paid by, the local government, continued to be
appointed by, and reported directly to, the Emir of Zaria. Though Kataf men were now
both Local Government Chairman and District Head, Kataf disaffection continued to
simmer, fuelled by what they regard as their continued subordination to Zaria, and the
alleged nepotistic appointment of the minority, but now ‘allegedly indigenous’,
Hausa/Fulani elements from the southern Kaduna area to political and other offices in the
State and Federal governments as ‘representatives’ of the people of the area. They formed
the view that elements of the local Hausa/Fulani communities were using their wider
connections within the Nigerian state system and the society in general to continue their
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created in 1996. However, tensions rose again in late 1996, when some Kataf Christians
protested the building of a mosque by the Hausa community.
This Kataf version of events is hotly disputed by the Hausa community of Zangon Kataf
(Mustapha 1994). Nevertheless, it illustrates how exclusivity in inter-group relations
during the pre-colonial era can be carried on into the post-colonial period. Though
identities are constantly changing, some elements of it can actually remain constant over
a long period of time. Secondly, the colonial impact was to turn exclusivity into open
hostility. Thirdly, the series of crises in southern Kaduna State from about 1980 reflect,
not just the history of animosity between these minority communities and their guest
Hausa communities, but also socio-economic pressures deriving from land alienation and
the extension of ‘development’. At the cross-roads of these historical and contemporary
tensions lie a bitter conflict over notions of citizenship, group and individual rights, and
justice (Mustapha 1994).
For the Kataf, citizenship is defined by autochtony, not only to emphasis Kataf
‘traditional’ qualities such as membership of clans but also to exclude the Hausa/Fulani
immigrant. On their part, the Hausa of Zangon Kataf emphasise residency as a criteria
for citizenship. This is not just a matter of expediency, for it also conforms to Hausa
values and historical practices. Similarly, Kataf notions of rights emphasise the group
rights of the land-holding lineages, to the total exclusion of the individual rights of the
immigrants. On the other hand, and consistent with their land tenure practices, the Hausa
tend to emphasise individual rights. Justice for the Kataf is the correction of historical
injustices; for the Hausa it is criminal justice, aimed at punishing those who have broken
the laws during the riots. It is not clear to what extent these issues are fought over within
the Kataf community but, on the whole, Kataf identity has evolved largely as a negative
reaction to the continued presence of the Hausa community in its midst.
But the evolution of Kataf identity is not entirely negative. As noted earlier, there is the
concept of Netzit (Our People), through which the Kataf seek to make common cause
with other groups in southern Kaduna and Plateau States. These groups have very similar
historical, cultural, political and demographic characteristics but the concept of ‘our
people’ is almost certainly a development of the colonial era and expresses not just the
similarities in the circumstances of these peoples but also their common opposition to
being subjugated to the Hausa/Fulani Emirates. The evolution of Kataf identity expresses
not just long-standing  animosities, but also fits neatly into the regionally based
‘majority/minority’ divide that emerged in the terminal colonial period. Despite latter
transformations in Kataf identity such as the increasing identification with Christianity,
the basic elements of Kataf identity suggest that the late colonial construction of
majority/minority is of continuing relevance.
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With the imposition of formal colonial rule, the economic exploitation of the Igbo in the
hinterland by the eastern Ijaw and the Efik of Old Calabar came to an end. This
exploitation had been based on an advantageous position on the trade routes, and better
access to firearms. With formal colonization, ethnic identities crystallized. With the
constitutional and electoral developments of the 1950s, the smaller ethnic groups were
transformed into ‘minorities’; a point dramatically made by the replacement of Eyo Ita,
of Efik ‘minority’ background, by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, as head of the regional
government. Thenceforth, the eastern minorities protested real or imagined domination
(Willink Commission 1958) and sought to protect themselves through alliance with the
ruling parties of the other regions. During the Civil War, 1967-1970, the eastern
minorities were firmly on the federal side. The favourable disposition of many eastern
minorities towards the central government persisted till the mid-1980s.
The causes of the collapse in confidence are traceable not to direct state/minority
relations per se but to the wider dynamics of Nigerian politics and economy which
gradually, but radically, altered state/minority relations, particularly in the Niger Delta.
Firstly, state creation, a crucial panacea in minority eyes right up to 1967, did not solve
the problem of minority  marginalization. The ‘majority’ three groups continued to
control more states and to benefit enormously from the distributional logic of federal
governance. The more the minorities agitated for state creation, the more the status quo
was maintained by the creation of states in both majority and minority areas.
Consequently, minority groups started making radical demands for the restructuring of
the entire federation along confederate ethnic lines.
Secondly, minority groups, particularly from the Niger Delta agitated against the revenue
allocation formula which lay at the heart of distributional politics. Prior to the creation of
states, the principal criterion for revenue allocation was the principle of derivation. In the
process of concentrating economic powers on the centre, the principle of derivation was
dropped. This change occurred precisely at the point when oil, found largely in southern
minority areas, became the mainstay of the national economy. The minorities complained
that they got only 3% of the wealth from their area, the bulk going to the political
constituencies of the majority groups. Minority agitation led to the increase of their share
to 13%, but this is a far cry from the 50% many minority organizations were agitating
for. Minority demands have therefore been widening to include demands for ‘self-
determination’ so that they could control their land and resources. Coupled to this
particular demand was the minority complaint that while their resources were being used
to develop other parts of the country, their own areas were left without basic social
amenities and subjected to environmental pollution.
Thirdly, the minorities clamoured for power sharing, complaining that political and
administrative offices were monopolized by the majority groups, particularly the
Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba. Many minority organizations, such as the Ika Group, the
Akwa Ibom Emancipation Group, the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality Rights Protection
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Ukwani Forum agitated for the rotation of political offices between ethnically defined
zones, and a radical restructuring of the central government and army along confederate
lines (Okwuosa et al 1994).
The central government which had been seen as an ally up to the early 1980s was now
seen as the major blockage of the realization of minority interests. The numerous anti-
Hausa agitation of the northern minorities in the Middle Belt, pointed out in the Zangon
Kataf case, were matched, amongst the southern minorities, by a broad anti central
government agitation. Also attacked were multinational oil companies like Shell, and the
elites of the majority groups, particularly the Hausa/Fulani and, to a lesser extent, the
Yoruba. We can see therefore that minority agitation increased amongst both the
northern and southern minorities in the 1980s, but their respective targets and demands
were different.
By the early 1990s, many southern minority groups were thoroughly disaffected, with the
consequent radicalization of their organizations. Separatist confederate demands, coupled
with direct action against the multinational companies became more pronounced. The
first major confrontation took place in Umuechem in October 1990, and involved a
confrontation between the youth of the community and staff of Shell. The Nigerian army
was called in on Shell’s behalf, leading to the sacking of the Umuechem community with
many fatalities, including the community leader. A seething resentment against the
federal government gradually broke into the open. Also in October 1990, MOSOP was
formed, and adopted the Ogoni Bill of Rights which called for a halt to environmental
degradation and the control of Ogoni resources by the Ogoni. When the government did
not respond to the Bill of Rights, the Ogoni internationalized their struggle through the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), and made direct demands on
the oil companies for compensation. In 1993, mass demonstrations were carried out and a
section of the MOSOP leadership demanded that the Ogoni boycott the 1993 Presidential
elections. This amounted to a repudiation of the legitimacy of the centre (Mustapha
1996).
At this point, differences within the MOSOP leadership emerged around the structure
and strategies of the organization. The conservative faction, representing an older
generation used to bargaining for political offices at the centre ‘on behalf of their
people’, disagreed with the proposition that MOSOP should be an umbrella organization
for other Ogoni organizations: National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP),
Federation of Ogoni Women Association (FOWA), Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers
(COTRA), Ogoni Teachers Union (OTU), and Council of Ogoni Churches (COC). The
logic behind this organizational restructuring was the claim that the conservative faction
of MOSOP leadership often took decisions without follow-up action aimed at
implementation (Saro-Wiwa 1995). This re-organization was therefore aimed at
challenging ineffective leadership by instilling ‘organizational discipline’. As far as the
conservative faction was concerned, the suggested reorganization was a ploy to
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They accused Saro-Wiwa of seeking to gain total control of the organization and of
instigating his youthful supporters to undertake ‘militant action’ against those members
of the MOSOP leadership and the entire Ogoni elite who posed a challenge to his
ambitions. The division came to a head over the question of boycotting the 1993
elections and the conservative faction withdrew from MOSOP. In subsequent
developments, four Ogoni chiefs were murdered, allegedly by NYCOP militants
instigated by Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa and eight others were subsequently ‘tried’ and
executed under questionable circumstances (Mustapha forthcoming). Despite state
repression, the situation in Ogoni is far from resolved. About 50,000 Ogoni were
estimated to have fled continued repression in Nigeria through the neighbouring Benin
Republic. In mid-1997, the refugee camp still had 2500 persons.
In the Ogoni case, we can discern a number of strands in the evolution of southern
minority identity. Unlike in the case of the northern minorities, where agitation was
largely directed against a majority group, the Hausa/Fulani, the southern minorities
directed their agitation against a central government that was once seen as an ally.
Secondly, while northern minorities tended to demand for ‘traditional’ issues, such as the
restoration or creation of their own autonomous chiefdoms, southern minorities tended to
call the very foundation of the centralized military state into question by demanding for
confederalism and the rotation of state offices. Southern minority identity was being
shaped, not so much by the demand for cultural autonomy as is the case with the northern
minorities, but by the demand for political, economic and administrative autonomy. They
were not so much as asserting their distinctness, but demanding political recognition and
expression of that distinctness. Their demands therefore related directly to what it meant
to be a ‘Nigerian’. By changing the current definition of what it meant to be a Nigerian,
loaded as that definition is with inequalities and iniquities, they hoped to eradicate their
‘minority’ status. The subsequent confrontation with the centralized state is producing a
radicalized, seperatist identity amongst the southern minorities. The ideal, far from
realized, of a common citizenship is increasingly called into question and challenged.
At stake is not just the notion of ‘Nigerianness’, but also that of ‘Ogoniness’. In the
course of the agitation for Ogoni rights the MOSOP leadership was divided over three
crucial issues. The first conflict was over the Ogoni strategy within national politics.
While the conservative faction was indeed committed to the cause, many of its members
were evidently wedded to the clientalist politics of the Nigerian state. On the other hand,
the radical faction adopted a stance of non-cooperation, bordering on confrontation, with
the state. The second conflict, closely related to the first, was the question of who would
lead the movement and in what direction? Here, ideological and political disagreements
were mingled with personal ambitions and personality conflicts (Mustapha forthcoming).
Thirdly, generational rivalries and differential experiences tended to pit the clientalists
against the younger professionals. These conflicts became reflected in the construction of
Ogoni identity as the clientalists were dubbed ‘vultures’ parasiting on the Ogoni plight,
while the radicals were in turn attacked as ‘violence-prone thugs’ intent on promoting
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leading conservative likened Saro-Wiwa to ‘Stalin who eliminated all his colleagues as
soon as he took over’ (FGN nd). Each side presented itself as the ‘authentic’ voice of the
Ogoni and the rival faction as ‘illegitimate’. The conservatives were accused of
opportunism in their relations with the central government. On the other hand, Saro-
Wiwa was portrayed as being in a diabolical alliance with international financiers intent
on using the Ogoni case as a pretext for destabilize Nigeria. These conflicting
perspectives and definitions were often fought out in newspaper advertorials and press
releases.
The federal government has become to the Ogoni, what Europe is to the contemporary
Tory Party in Britain. Consequently, Ogoni identity became bifurcated and contested,
creating a fertile ground for state intervention. Interestingly, the Ogoni have about four
dialects or languages and five kingdoms - Babbe, Gokana, Tai, Nyo-Khana and Ken-
Khana. But the overtly politicized nature of contemporary ‘Ogoniness’ dictated that these
linguistic and historical political divergence within the Ogoni had little relevance to the
struggle between the warring factions. Nevertheless, the Ogoni struggle had the impact of
emphasising their distinctiveness, making it possible for the state to stir up anti-Ogoni
sentiments within other neighbouring minority groups.
C.3 Taraba: Minority against Minority.
In the 1950s, after the minority groups woke up to the potential and real consequences of
their minority status, there was a sense of common purpose amongst the minority groups
of each region, expressed in romanticized notions of the Middle Belt movement in the
north, the COR movement in the east, and the Midwest state movement in the west.
Opinions were not always united across the board, but sufficient numbers of minority
groups were committed to these movements to give them credibility. In the late 1970s,
these pan-minority sentiments continued to find expression in Club 19, a political
grouping formed with the purpose of bringing a ‘majority of minorities’ into power at the
federal level. Even as late as 1993, a pro-Babangida group was formed, calling itself the
Fourth Force, and claiming to represent the minorities across the country. It claimed that
the minorities put together were more than the three majority groups and therefore had a
duty to unite and dictate the political fortunes of the country. However, much of the
common ground built around a shared minority identity has been destroyed over the
years, partly by the creation of states and the emergence of statism and also by minority
competition in some states. General political and economic developments in the country
have tended to exacerbate these divisive trends. As a result, divisive issues have gained
prominence, pitting minority group against minority group. We must therefore add the
minority/minority divide to the prior majority/minority divide. The ways in which these
developments evolved in the transformation of identities is examined in the bloody three-
cornered fight in Taraba State between the Jukun, the Tiv, the Kuteb and the Chamba.
In 1991, what amounted to a civil war broke out in the Wukari/Takum areas of Taraba
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raged between 1991-2, and the Takum crisis which took place between 1992-3. At the
root of both crises were pre-colonial and colonial animosities tightly linked to
contemporary conflicts over political and administrative offices and agricultural
resources. The Zangon Kataf case can be seen to represent the continued resilience of
historical animosities, shrouded in competing contemporary claims to political,
commercial and agricultural resources. And the Ogoni case can be seen as a reaction to
centralizing and monopolistic developments within the nation-state. The Taraba case
represents a mixture of both tendencies. The ‘Hausa factor’ was also present in Taraba.
C.3.1 The Wukari Crisis.
Between 1991 and 1992, large-scale fighting involving the use of sophisticated weapons
took place around the Jukun paramount town of Wukari. The principal protagonists were
the Jukun and the Tiv. Others such as the Kuteb, Chamba and ‘Hausa’ were subsequently
dragged in to a lesser degree. The ‘Hausa’ of Wukari deserve a brief comment: their
lingua franca is Hausa though a large number of them actually come from non-Hausa
areas such as Borno. Unconfirmed, but realistic, estimates suggest that about 5000 Jukun
and 15000 Tiv lost their lives in the course of the crisis. In all, about 53 villages with an
estimated population of 250,000 inhabitants were razed to the ground and the population
dispersed. Farm stock and farms were burnt.
The historical setting for the crisis started in the 1910s, when the colonial administration
allowed or encouraged the Tiv to migrate in large numbers into areas that are regarded as
Jukun territory. Colonial policy, reflecting the idiosyncratic attitudes of various officials
on the ground, had quite contradictory effects. Right at the beginning of Indirect Rule,
Palmer formed the opinion that the Tiv, who did not have a centralized state system,
should be brought under the Aku Uka of Wukari, the paramount head of the Jukun. He
argued that Jukun influence extended into Tiv territory under the Kwararafa Empire
which was noted for its military exploits. The Tiv were clearly cast as an ‘inferior’ group
to the Jukun. Consequently, Tiv areas such as Katsina Ala, Zaki Biam and parts of
Kwande were administered under Wukari Division. It was only in 1926 that a Tiv
Division was created bringing most of the Tiv areas under a common administration.
Even then, some areas remained under Wukari. These colonial boundary adjustments
have continued to create confusion as to who belongs or belonged to where and the
nature of their rights in such areas.
A second strand in colonial policy was to encourage the Tiv to migrate into Wukari
Division itself. The Tiv were not only a large group, their population also expanded
much faster than those of their neighbours. In some areas in Tiv territory, particularly in
Kwande and Vandekya to the south, population pressure was acute, rising about 1937 to
190 persons per square mile. By 1952, some areas in Shangev were reported to have over
600 persons per square mile (NAK/Makprof 4545). This pressure on the land was
accentuated by the Tiv farming system of slash and burn and shifting cultivation. The
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territory of their neighbours in search of fresh, fertile land. Moves to introduce more
sustainable farming methods failed and by 1948, some colonial officials were claiming
that:
Tiv expansion is not due to land hunger or to the results of uneconomic methods
of farming but to a ‘traditional code demanding expansive advance in a
predetermined direction’. Such a demand for ‘lebensraum’ and the population
movements in which it results are difficult to control... .(NAK/Makprof  4545).
The expansion of the Tiv into Idoma territory to the southwest and Ogoja territory to the
south were particularly resisted, leading the colonial administration to encourage Tiv
migration ‘in the Northerly and Easterly directions’ (NAK/SNP 17/9). Indeed by 1914, a
‘Munshi Wall’ (Munshi was the colonial name for the Tiv) had been erected to the south
and west. The decision to encourage Tiv migration into Jukun territory reflected a
reversal of colonial perceptions of both groups. The ‘superior’ Jukun, with their history
of a centralized state, were not expanding, economically and demographically, as the
‘inferior’ Tiv. Since this had a direct bearing on the capacity of the colonial state to raise
tax revenue, official perceptions of both groups changed. Wukari was now described as
having a ‘decaying population’, while the Tiv were:
superior in every way to all the peoples by which it is surrounded, - totals now
about 500,000 souls, - and has a percentage of about 40 children per 100 of the
population. The food producing capacity of the tribe is perhaps the greatest per
head of population of any tribe in Nigeria - but it is clear that unless provision
is made for their expansion, the land available for them now will not continue
to support them...(NAK/Makprof 2403).
The ‘hard-working’ Tiv were therefore encouraged to move into the territory of the
‘lazy’ Jukun and the other groups to the east and north. Tiv settlements were established
in such areas as Wukari, Muri, Shendam, Lafia and Wamba Divisions. By the 1990s, the
Tiv formed an absolute majority of the entire population of Wukari Local Government.
Not only were the ‘strangers’ more wealthy than their ‘hosts’, they now had the
population base, in a one-person-one-vote ethnicized electoral setting, to gain political
ascendancy.
The conflict over Tiv expansionism and over agricultural resources simmered for many
decades, reaching a new level in 1979, when Tiv candidates started winning elections in
the area. In that year, Tiv candidates from Wukari Local Government were voted into the
Gongola State House of Assembly; Dr Agbide, a Tiv, even became a Commissioner in
the Gongola State government. With the creation of Taraba State from Gongola and the
consequent narrowing of the electoral base, the political stakes were raised. The first
skirmish occurred in 1987 when the Babangida administration initiated local government
elections on a non-party basis. Danladi Yakubu, a Hausa ‘stranger’ was elected chairman
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minority, albeit in what they regarded as ‘their’ home territory. The Jukun blamed the
Tiv for supporting the Hausa candidate. The whole affair was put down to a Tiv/Hausa
conspiracy against the Jukun. The Jukun and the Hausa had been political allies in the
First Republic (in the NPC) and the Second Republic (in the NPN). But the
fragmentation of established political networks since the military intervention of 1983
saw the collapse of the Jukun/Hausa alliance and the emergence of a Tiv/Hausa alliance. 
With the approach of gubernatorial elections in the newly created Taraba State in 1991,
matters came to a head. Fearing a Tiv ‘take-over’ of the new state, the Jukun resorted to
‘ethnic cleansing’. The Jukun elite was however careful to state its case in more
‘civilized’ terms. They accused the Tiv of lawlessness in occupying Jukun lands and
establishing bogus chieftaincies over same. Secondly, they accused the Tiv of 
‘disloyalty’ to a place where many of them had lived for generations. They claimed that
the Tiv preferred to pay their tax in the predominantly Tiv Benue State, whilst living in
Taraba. Tiv attachments to their natal home base - for burials and weddings etc. - were
held up as justifying the assertion that they were not really ‘Tarabans’. On their part, the
Tiv denied that they were recent migrants, claiming that they had been in Muri Province
since the early colonial period. They asserted their rights to the land, both as early
members of the previous administrative unit, and as ‘Nigerians’.
It is clear, however, that Tiv nationalism had a hand in the whole affair, particularly after
the Tiv elite in Benue mobilized men and materials to come to the aid of their brethren in
Taraba. It is suggested in some quarters that the Tiv elite wanted to present their group as
the ‘largest minority group in Nigeria’, with political presence - and clout - in Benue,
Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kogi  and Cross River States. As for the ‘Hausa’, they
accused the Jukun of belligerence towards ‘outsiders’ as witnessed in the attack on the
Igbos in Wukari in the 1980s. Some ‘Hausa’ were also killed in 1991.
Though the Wukari crisis was presented as a clash over land resources, the real stakes -
hardly commented upon in the open - were political. At issue was the question of who
was ‘indigenous’ to the area and therefore had prior political rights in the new Taraba
State. New political and administrative changes gave new meaning to demographic
trends, forcing the issue of identity high on the political agenda. This was an issue which
pit minority against minority. This did not mean, however, that minority/majority issues
were absent even in Taraba. Federal government response to the mayhem in Taraba was
so slow in coming, suggesting that the area being a ‘minority’ area, no real stakes were
involved. Secondly, in Zangon Kataf where Hausa interests were directly involved,
government resources were poured in to rehabilitate the area and  prison sentences were
handed out to alleged instigators and perpetrators of the killings, mostly Kataf. In Wukari
and Takum, however, no trials were held despite virtual three years of carnage. And no
government resources were made available for reconstruction. The minorities may be
fighting for political supremacy in circumscribed political spaces, but they have yet to
dent the suffocating dominance of majority interests. When the Federal government
finally stepped in, it sent in troops to restore law and order, and brokered a deal requiringQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS09 Page 18
the Tiv to register their land interests with the local government authority. The
underlying demographic and political issues remain unresolved.
C.3.2. The Takum Crisis.
In the Takum crisis, there is the total fragmentation of minority identity for reasons
related to the Wukari crisis. This crisis resulted in killings and the destruction of property
in 1992 and 1993, but the scale and casualties were much less compared to the Wukari
crisis. In 1992, a Chamba/Jukun group opened fire with automatic rifles on the Kuteb
annual cultural festival, the kuchicheb, killing about six people. In the rash of fighting
that took place afterwards, two Kuteb and five Chamba villages were destroyed with the
loss of many lives. In the 1993 version of the same ceremony, more killings took place,
but these were largely restricted to outlying rural areas. During the mayhem, the crisis
was presented as an extension of the Wukari crisis. The Kuteb were seen as allies of the
Tiv/Hausa, while the Jukun were seen as allies of the Chamba. No doubt, there was some
element of justification for these perceptions, but the reality was more complex. The
main fight was between the Chamba and the Kuteb, with passive or active alliances being
struck with other groups; the Kuteb refused to side the Jukun attack on the Tiv, forcing
the Jukun to sympathize with the Chamba. Meanwhile, Kuteb/Tiv relations remained
cool, with potential for open conflict over Tiv expansion onto Kuteb land.
The issue at stake was also political, instigated by the fragmentation of Jukun identity
and the emergence of conflicting political claims arising therefrom. Here, pre-colonial
animosities mingled with identity constructions in the colonial and post-colonial period
to produce tensions in inter-group relations. The tensions were then fought out in the
political realm.
In the course of colonial occupation at the turn of the century, the British first made
contact with the Jukun at Ibi on the Benue. This gave the Jukun an early start in the
acquisition of western education and advancement in the colonial and post-colonial
bureaucracies. Furthermore, colonial officials tended to favour the Jukun over all other
groups in the region because of their centralized state system and pre-colonial history in
the Kwararafa Empire,. The other ethnic groups were included in Wukari Division on the
understanding that they had been part of the pre-colonial Jukun empire. This privileging
of Jukun identity around Wukari/Takum forced many members of the other ethnic
groups in the area to adopt Jukun identity.
Closely allied to the Jukun are the Chamba, who had migrated into the area from the
region of present-day Cameroon Republic. A group of the Chamba settled in Ganye,
while another group moved on to Donga and Takum. The Chamba were able to impose
their domination over the majority Ichen in Donga. Even though the Ichen have the
larger population, Donga district remains a Chamba preserve. They also raided the Kuteb
for slaves, and moved into the Takum area. With the privileging of Jukun identity in the
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adopted Jukun language and identity. Most of the other ethnic groups also assumed Jukun
identity to varying degrees. Being ‘Jukun’ then meant a ‘core’ Jukun group plus a host of
other associated ethnic groups, the most important of which were the Chamba, the Kuteb
and the Ichen.
This broader ‘Jukun’ identity started to collapse in the 1950s, with the looming prospect
of electoral politics. Secondly, increased educational opportunities had heightened
awareness of ethnic differences and generated a pool of ideologues and political
entrepreneurs eager to ‘rediscover’ their ‘true’ identity. This process of self-assertion was
particularly noticeable amongst groups like the Kuteb who retained some
cultural/linguistic distinction from the Jukun. In the face of this challenge, the ruling
Aku Uka of Wukari, Atoshi Agbumanu, embarked on a forceful campaign to consolidate
‘Jukun’ identity around the ‘core’ Jukun by promoting the formation of the Kwararafa
Congress in the 1950s. In response, the Kuteb formed the Kuteb Yatso, a cultural self-
help movement. Kuteb grievance was basically economic. They claimed that of the three
Districts that made up Wukari Division - Wukari, Takum and Donga -, most of the taxes
came from Takum but the Kuteb who formed the vast majority of that district got the
least in terms of social amenities, scholarships and bureaucratic appointments. On the
other hand, Wukari district was said to have contributed the least, but monopolized all
resources in Wukari. The Kuteb had not only began a process of self-assertion, they had
also started a conflictual relationship with the Jukun.
The strained relationship worsened as the electoral system got underway in 1954. It is
claimed that in that year, a tripartite understanding was reached to share political offices
in the area between the three major groups - Jukun, Chamba and Kuteb - under the
banner of the dominant regional party, the NPC. Ibrahim Sangari, a Wukari Jukun was
voted into the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos and Jolly Tanko Yusuf, a
Takum Chamba, was sent to the regional House of Assembly in Kaduna. When new
elections were called in 1959, the Kuteb felt it was now their turn to nominate a
candidate to the regional assembly. The accord collapsed, leading to the defection of the
Kuteb to the Tiv-led UMBC. Though Tanko Yusuf retained his seat, Sangari was
defeated by a UMBC candidate.
By the 1990s, this process of the fragmentation of a broader ‘Jukun’ identity had
accelerated as the Kuteb challenged what they saw as a Jukun/Chamba hegemony.
Furthermore, the Chamba, even though they remain Jukun speaking, became more
assertive of a separate identity of their own. This assertiveness was evident in the
invitation to the Chief of Ganye to present the staff of office to the current Gara of
Donga. From a common ‘Jukun’ identity in the early colonial period, there was the
development of three identity conglomerations built around the Jukun, Chamba and
Kuteb. Indeed, the process of fragmentation continues even within the conglomerations.
The Jukun conglomeration is facing increasing self-assertion from its sub-groups, the
Tigun, Ndoro, Nama, Jibu, Ichen and Kpanzun. Meanwhile, the Ayikuben, Mamu,
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conglomerate. The Chamba conglomeration faces similar pressures from the Tikari,
Lufum, Daka Jidu and Paati. But the Chamba conglomerate seems to be more
homogenous and coherent than the other two. 
It was within this process of the fragmentation of ‘Jukun’ identity that each of the three
major groups started staking out its territorial and political space. And this process
ultimately brought the Chamba and the Kuteb into conflict over the chieftainship of
Takum. The Kuteb claim that under the colonial system, the chieftainship  of Takum -
chief and kingmakers - was an all-Kuteb affair. Then under the first post-colonial
regional government, the law was changed in 1963. Kuteb kingmakers were reduced
from five to four, and three non-Kuteb members were brought in; the leaders or clan
heads of the Jukun, Chamba and ‘Hausa’ in Takum. The Kuteb claim that this change
was instigated by Jolly Tanko Yusuf, over whose candidacy, the tripartite electoral pact
had broken down. In 1975, the Benue-Plateau State Government made further changes to
the law. Kuteb kingmakers were reduced from four to two, Chamba representation was
increased from one to two, and ‘Hausa’ representation was abolished. The Jukun clan
head was made Chairman of the committee of kingmakers and deputy to the chief.
Effectively, a Chamba/Jukun alliance on the committee would most likely lead to a three-
against-two majority in favour of a non-Kuteb chief. The Kuteb claim that the 1975
changes were instigated by Ibrahim Sangari who lost his Lagos seat in 1959, but in 1975
was a Commissioner in the Benue-Plateau government.
On their part, the Takum Chamba argue that the federal government recently divided
Takum Local Government Area into two, Ussa and Takum, with all the Kuteb in Ussa
and the Jukun and Chamba in Takum. There is the hint that the Kuteb should ‘move
over’ to their own local government area. The argument goes further that Takum was
originally Jukun, the Jukun name for Takum being Yoka or ‘inside the walls’. The
argument continues that Takum had previously had both Jukun and Chamba chiefs, and
that it was only in the 1930s that Kuteb chiefs were appointed. Since then, the Kuteb are
said to have had four chiefs, but under no circumstances would they be allowed to
monopolize the chieftainship to the exclusion of both Chamba and Jukun. The Kuteb
counter by arguing that since the Jukun have the Aku Uka of Wukari, and the Chamba
have the Gara of Donga, the Kuteb must retain the Ukwe of Takum.
It was the tension deriving from this political contestation which fed into the Wukari
Crisis, leading to the killings of 1992 and 1993. Here again, the central issues remain
unresolved. The Ukwe stool is now vacant, and it is possible that jockeying for it may
lead to further crisis.
D. Conclusion: Identity Issues and the African Crises.
Much work has been done since the early 1980s on identity issues in Africa. There is
however a clear difference in the orientation of studies emanating from academics in the
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cultural impact of colonialism, particularly on the ‘invention’ or ‘imagination’ of African
ethnicity and ‘tradition’ (Ranger 1994,1995). These studies have deepened our
understanding of the precise nature of the colonial impact and the resulting
transformations in identity. Unfortunately, much of this scholarship from the West is
historical in nature, lacking any obvious connection to the contemporary crises in Africa.
The main debates between ‘social constructionists’ who emphasize the imagined and
invented nature of ethnicity, and ‘primordialists’ who emphasize age-old primordial
qualities, often come across as quibbling over interpretative nuances, completely
unconnected with the urgency of contemporary African life. On the other hand, scholars
in African have tended to pay only limited attention to the historical dimensions of
identity in Africa, concentrating instead on its structural manifestations in the African
crises.
For example (Mamdani 1996) has explained the genesis of the recent Rwandese civil war
and genocide in terms of the changing notions of citizenship and identity in Uganda. He
argues that the shift from citizenship based on blood-line and ethnicity to one based on
residency made it possible for the Rwandese refugees in Uganda to enlist in the
Museveni-led NRA. With the end of the war, there was a reverse shift in the definition of
citizenship, with ethnicity and indigeneity returning to prominence. He argues that it was
this shifting identity of the Rwandese refugee/citizens/refugees in Uganda which
precipitated the RPF armed return to Rwanda. In another context, Mamdani examines the
conflicting ways long-term migrants from Mali and Burkina Faso in the Ivory Coast are
regarded as migrants and citizens by the opposition and the government respectively.
These conflicting perceptions had consequences for the electoral politics of the transition
from one-party rule in Ivory Coast.
Another example is Mafeje’s (1991) study of agricultural production in sub-saharan
Africa. He argues that in most of these societies, land is held by lineages. Women
continue to belong to their natal lineages even after they get married and re-locate to their
husbands’ lineage. In their lineage of residence, women are responsible for the
reproduction of the lineage and also for agricultural production. Yet their access to land
is constrained and mediated in these lineages of residence precisely because they are
considered to be members of their natal lineages. He poses a challenge to African
jurisprudence to address this gendered disjuncture between residence/identity/resources.
Both the Western and the African strands in the study of identity issues have enriched our
understanding of African society and politics. However, it would seem that much could
be gained by linking the study of identities to the crises in Africa. From this perspective,
we can begin to highlight some central connections between the tendencies within
minority identity transformation and the crises of the Nigerian state. To begin with, it
must be restated that even under ‘normal’ circumstances, identities are in constant
transformation. They would have still been transformed, with or without the crises in the
state. Indeed as I have tried to show, many of the transformations, both positive and
negative, started almost as soon as ‘minority’ identity emerged in the 1950s. The uniqueQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS09 Page 22
thing about the crises of the state is that it generates the institutions, personalities,
processes and dynamics which condition and give meaning and context to the
transformations in identity. It accelerates some tendencies while discouraging others;
often, it imbues ‘neutral’ developments with added meanings.
In the Nigerian context, two related crises are of particular relevance; the rise of a
centralized military authoritarian state, and the economic crisis. By the time the military
took-over power in December 1983, the Nigerian state was already highly centralized
and the democratic ideal was highly contested at different levels of the state and the
society. With the return of military rule, a militaristic authoritarianism was grafted onto
the centralized structures of the state. Though this military authoritarianism started as a
collective leadership under the Buhari/Idiagbon regime, it soon degenerated into a one-
man autocratic rule under Babangida and Abacha. Related to this political development is
the economic crisis which became pronounced from about 1982, leading to the adoption
of a structural adjustment programme in 1986. Structural adjustment has since become
just another aspect of this economic crisis, deepening the crisis of a common social
citizenship (Olukoshi 1996).  Combined together, economic crisis and military
authoritarianism created an atmosphere of diminishing resources, and a personalized and
idiosyncratic distribution of the little that was left.
The stage was therefore set for political entrepreneurs to seek to maximise access to
economic and political resources by mobilizing particularistic identities and hitching
these constituencies to the political agenda of the military autocrats. As a community
magazine in southwestern Nigeria put it:
The reality of today’s Nigeria is that any tribe, State, Community or
interest group that does not want to be lost in the crowd, should device
means of consistently putting its interests, needs and problems across to
the Government...(Idanre Community Magazine Sept. 1996).
More often than not, the ‘devices’ employed rely heavily on advancing particularist and
exclusionary claims. As a consequence, there is a heightened sense of ethnic
consciousness and conflict (Osaghae 1995). The transformation of minority identities
since 1985 is best understood against the background of this wider dynamic. While some
minority groups joined the frenzy of advancing particularist goals and interests - as in
Taraba State -, others saw themselves as ‘victims’ and resorted to the same particularism
as a means of defence - Ogoni and Zangon Kataf. The combination of economic crisis,
structural adjustment and political engineering under autocratic tutelage was bound to
destabilize existing consensus, leading to the politics of difference and the splintering of
common identities. As Bangura (1995,7) succinctly puts it:
Recession and economic restructuring have reduced the resources available to
the state sector, and thus the incentives for disadvantaged groups or
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offered by the state. In addition, ethnic affiliations and forms of mobilisation
have become important as the scope for plural forms of organisation has
widened. I would like to stress the point that it is impossible to liberalise
ethnically plural societies under conditions of economic decline without
ethnicity becoming a major feature of political organisation. The demand for
forms of politics that are devoid of ethnicity is actually a pipe dream!QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS09 Page 24
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